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Abstract 
 
Data breaches are occurring at an unprecedented 
rate.  In February 2019 alone, over a million 
individuals were reported to the United States 
government as having been involved in a breach of 
their medical data by healthcare entities.  Although 
many organizations have some policies, procedures 
and risk management components in place, few (if any) 
organizations are centrally connecting legal 
requirements, penetration tests, policies and 
procedures into a standardized and consistent 
methodology for further analysis and auditing.  This 
research produces a new open source risk management 
standardized library coordinating the aforementioned 
risk management components.  The new library is 
applied to an open source vulnerable web-application 
example to emphasize the benefits from the adoption of 
such a public standardized risk assessment library.   
 
1. Introduction  
 
In the United States of America, medical entities 
are covered under federal laws to protect patient 
information[1].  Specifically, Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and 
Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health Act (HITECH) [2] are regulations at 
the federal-level to protect the privacy and security of 
patient health information such as name, birthdate, 
social security numbers, medical record numbers, etc.  
This specific digital patient information is considered 
electronic patient health information (ePHI).  Medical 
entities may also be under other legal requirements 
such as non-disclosure or confidentiality requirements 
of other data (e.g. research, employee, drug, etc.). 
Since many covered entities are siloed where 
different components of the organizational risk (e.g. 
legal, budget, security, privacy, technology, etc.) are 
being managed by different department entities without 
a standardized and well-connected system, 
organizations deal with frustrations both when needing 
to produce detailed and accurate audit records and 
when communicating risks to the business.  For 
example, an exception to a policy may result in 
unidentified organizational risk if these components 
are not consistently coordinated and periodically 
reviewed/updated.  
The research that is described contributes a 
standardized risk assessment library model and, then, 
provides an example use case where a vulnerable web 
application risk assessment findings are connect with 
the developed standardized library.  This connection 
enables the organization to report on its risks and 
maintain internal statistics as related to technical 
limitations, administrative limitations, organizational 
policy exceptions and federal legal requirements to 
inform the business, auditors and business-associates 
on the risks involved if the organization adopts the 
vulnerable web application into its business processes. 
 
2. Risk Assessment Standards 
 
The National Institute of Standards and 
Technologies (NIST) has produces many Special 
Publications on Risk Assessments [3].  In fact, many 
organizations around the world are following the NIST 
Risk Assessment frameworks.  In addition to 
developing a standardized framework, NIST and 
MITRE have worked tirelessly to produce a 
standardized attack/malware (e.g. Common Attack 
Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [4] 
and National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [5]) and 
vulnerability dictionaries (e.g. Common Weakness 
Enumeration (CWE) [6] and Bug Framework (BF) 
[7]).  These standardized dictionaries are agnostic to 
industries.  They have been developed to encourage a 
standardize languages for software faults since a 
standardized language promotes software development 
and software assurance tool discussions.  
To date the industry has worked tirelessly to 
standardize language on software bugs since software 
vulnerabilities and malware has been around for 
decades.  Recently, however, there has now become an 
industry need on the standardization of actual sub-
component findings for assessing risk.  For example, 
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two risk assessments for identical systems from 
different organizations may result in entirely different 
risk discovery.  Furthermore, the language applied into 
the assessment by the different organizations may be 
unique to each organization.  As such, a gap exists into 
the research and literature on standardizing the risk 
assessment findings.  This gap is mainly due to how 
recent risk assessments have become pertinent to 
organizational survival.  For example, Facebook 
announced that in March 2019 it appropriated three-
billion dollars to pay fines related to federal privacy 
regulation breaches [8].  
 
2. Risk Assessment Literature Review 
  
Related risk assessment literature involves the 
automation of risk assessments and education of risk 
assessments.  However, currently a research gap exists 
on the development of a standardized risk assessment 
library, which includes all risk components when 
developing findings. 
 
2.1. Risk Assessment Automation 
  
Risk assessment automation have been proposed in 
the form of automated penetration testing frameworks 
(e.g. [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], 
and [18]).  These automated tools are excellent 
resources for identifying vulnerabilities.  The focus of 
these automated frameworks are specific; but they are 
not focused on the importance of other risk assessment 
components, such as legal medical 
requirements/regulations.  Moreover, these frameworks 
are not focused on a standardization of language for 
cross-communication, cross-collaboration, auditing and 
legal-prosecution.  Conforming to a specific language 
improves overall process reporting and analysis.  
 
2.2. Risk Assessment Education 
  
Research on the education of risk assessments has 
primarily focused on the learning of penetration testing 
techniques (e.g. [19]).  These education curriculums 
are great learning resources. They do not, however, 
consider over-arching organizational risk, nor are they 
specific to the medical industry legal requirements.  
This paper fills this literature gap suggesting that 
penetration test findings should be carefully crafted to 
direct link with policies, laws, and other risk 
assessment components.  
 
 
 
 
2.3. Risk Assessment Standards 
 
Risk assessment standards literature is disjoint.  
Regulatory requirements, such as HIPAA and PCI, 
require risk assessment components.  Risk 
standardizing bodies and framework supporters such as 
NIST, Fair, ICS2, work to improve the overall risk 
assessment process.  Risk Management research is 
typically focused on introducing a new tool and can be 
geared towards a specific industry.  Table 1 below 
summarizes the different risk standards. 
 
Table 1 Risk Standards Summary 
Risk Standards Examples 
Regulatory HIPAA, PCI, SOC, SOX 
Industry 
Best Practice 
Models 
NIST, SANS Guidance, 
Fair, ISC2 
Research Tool and industry specific 
 
3. Risk Assessment Model 
 
There are many risk assessment models at large.  
Two of the predominate organizations are The Faire 
Institute and The National Institute of Standards 
(NIST).  In addition, risk assessments are typically 
quantitative, qualitative or a hybrid of the two.  NIST 
has one of the most popular and widespread 
standardized risk assessment frameworks in practice.  
Of all the industry best practice models, nothing at 
large is yet advocating for a standardize risk 
assessment library (e.g. a findings library) to enable 
cross-organizational, cross-system and cross-
application analysis.  
 
4. Risk Assessment Library Considerations 
 
Managing the risk in a medical setting is unique to 
the medical setting due to specific regulations.  As 
such, standard risk assessments such a penetration test 
from an outside organization may not properly report 
on the risk from the organizational level.  In addition, 
many medical facilities employ a ticketing system 
between siloed departments where connection between 
inter-department components is not identified in a 
standardized or repeatable format. 
The following five sub-sections identify 
organizational components, which should be connected 
in a standardized public risk assessment language 
dictionary to inform on organizational risk in a 
repeatable format (shown below in Table 2): legal 
requirements, training requirements, vendor 
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requirements, web application security requirements 
and organizational controls.  A standardized risk 
finding library encourages cross-organizational 
collaboration, communication, auditing and legal 
consistency if/when cases ultimately end-up in court. 
 
Table 2 Risk Component Examples Requiring 
Standardized Language 
Risk Component Example 
Legal HIPAA, PCI, SOX 
Training Specific requirements in 
legislation 
Vendor Business Associate 
Agreements 
Web Application Penetration Test Results 
Organizational 
Controls 
Technical, Physical, 
Budget, Administrative 
 
4.1. Legal Requirements 
  
     Medical entities have different federal requirements 
in the United States of America from other data-driven 
organizations.  Specifically, medical covered entities 
under HIPAA/HITECH are subject to audits by the 
United States Health and Human Services Office of 
Civil Rights (US HHS OCR).  In addition, 
organizational breaches of patient electronic health 
information of over 500 individuals must be reported 
to the OCR as ruled in HITCH and subject to federal 
fines.   
HIPAA also has specific mandates for electronic 
health data requirements, which should be consistently 
mapped during a risk assessment to appropriately 
manage organizational risk. 
Beyond the requirements of HIPAA/HITECH, 
medical entities may be under other legal requirements 
at the state, city or other contractual obligations, which 
also should be consistently mapped during a risk 
assessment.   
 
4.2. Training Requirements 
  
Training requirements may be requirements at the 
vendor-level, federal, state, or city requirements.  For 
example, the protection of credit card data under 
Payment Card Industry (PCI) compliance, expects 
software developers to be properly trained.  In 
addition, state labor laws and federal laws such as 
HIPAA also have specific training requirements.  If an 
organization or their accepted vendors are missing any 
of these training requirements, the organization may be 
finically liable.   
4.3. Vendor Requirements 
  
Vendors have different potential requirements, 
which must be in place, if/when a healthcare entity 
decides to work with the vendor.  Specifically, vendors 
managing a covered entities patient data traditionally 
needs to have a business associate agreement in place 
for federal requirements. Other federal or 
organizational requirements may be for annual vendor 
system/application penetration tests and malware 
incident responses plans. 
 
4.4. Application and System Requirements 
  
Application and system security are typically 
measured through their own risk assessments, tests and 
potentially source code auditing.  (Note there may be 
legal obligations to assessments, e.g. penetration test, 
which need to be in place prior to an assessment.)  
Typically, technical teams identify technical issues 
with applications and systems; however, they may not 
have correct use cases, legal and budget information at 
their disposal.  Once they perform a risk assessment, 
they may upload the paper document into an Integrated 
Risk Management (IRM) system; and, then, may even 
forget about the updating/re-assessing the collected 
risks.  In such cases, the risk assessment is more an 
impression rather than an informed reproducible 
science informing on the true likelihood and impact.  
The following sub-sections identify eight standard sub-
categories (visualized in the Table 3 below) employed 
during a risk penetration-assessment to report on the 
risk. 
 
Table 3: Penetration and System Analysis Findings 
Application and  
System Risk Domains 
Example findings 
Authentication Missing two-factor 
Session Management No session timeout 
Data-in-Motion Lack of TLS 
Data-at-Rest & Media Missing encryption 
Data-in-Use Datacenter RAM 
Access Control Privilege 
Escalation 
Auditing & 
Monitoring 
Lack of audit trails 
Injection/Input Vuln. SQL Injection 
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4.4.1. Authentication 
  
Authentication is the process or action of proving 
or showing something to be true, genuine, or valid.  
Best industry practices in authentication, such as 
multifactor authentication, vulnerable password rest 
requests, and robust error messages, are traditionally 
considered and tested during a system/web-application 
assessment. 
 
4.4.2. Session Management 
  
Session management is the rule set that governs 
interactions between a web-based application and 
users.  Browsers and websites typically use 
HTTPS/HTTP to communicate, and a web session is a 
series of requests and response transactions created by 
the same user after authentication.  In most cases, the 
user and server communicate with a special token so 
that the user does not have to repetitively re-
authenticate with each new server page.   
Current best practices in session/token management 
such as setting cookie flags (e.g. Secure and 
HTTPOnly), generating a random session token, and 
session timeout intervals, are examined. 
 
4.4.3. Data-in-Motion 
  
Data-in-motion is the data transfer of data between 
a client and a server.  Continually changing, this 
category of vulnerabilities include industry best 
practices in how to transmit the data such as 
confidentiality (e.g. encryption/decryption) and 
integrity (e.g. hashing both data or passwords) controls 
used during data transmission between clients and 
servers. 
 
4.4.4. Data-at-Rest and External Media 
  
Data-at-rest refers to data that is stored on a 
system/server. In an ever-changing dynamic landscape, 
this category of vulnerabilities includes industry best 
practices in the storage of the data to include controls 
such as confidentiality (e.g. encryption/decryption best 
practice algorithms), integrity (e.g. SHA512, bcrypt) 
and proper rotation/storage of encryption/decryption 
keys. 
 
4.4.5. Data-in-Use 
  
Data-in-use is typically considered in shared 
memory system such as datacenters where different 
client virtual machines or applications are running on a 
semi-trusted hardware/software infrastructure models 
(e.g. in Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a 
Service (PaaS), or Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), 
etc.).  These categories of vulnerabilities can be 
considered, such as confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information, on these shared system 
resources during an assessment (e.g. questions, ISO 
certifications, etc.). 
 
4.4.6. Access Control 
  
     Access controls are security techniques that 
regulates who or what can view/use resources stored in 
a system/application.  Current best practices in access 
controls, such as user-based or host-based, are 
traditionally coded into the software system/web-
application architecture.  These controls are typically 
tested during a risk penetration assessment. 
 
4.4.7. Auditing and Monitoring 
  
Systems and application generate logs before and 
after critical functions take place.  These logs are 
stored in the system/server backend for regulatory 
requirements, performance indicators and other 
analytics.  Current best practices in auditing, such as 
user login/logout activities, user access activities, and 
user upload/download activities are traditionally tested 
during an assessment. 
 
4.4.8. Injection and Input Vulnerabilities 
  
Injections and input vulnerabilities enable 
malicious entities to insert malicious code into running 
systems to deviate the system from normal 
functionality.  In some cases, these vulnerabilities can 
result in the unauthorized exposure of sensitive 
information.   
Current best practices in injection and input 
vulnerability controls such cross-site scripting (XSS), 
cross-site request forgery (CSRF) and SQL injection 
are traditionally considered and tested during a 
system/web-application assessment. 
 
4.5. Organizational Control Requirements 
  
At the organizational-level other non-technical 
requirements, perhaps managed by completely distinct 
organizational teams, may be required to manage the 
risk and meet legal requirements.  Three traditional 
sub-categories at the organizational-level are 
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policies/procedures, physical security, and budgeting 
for adverse circumstances. 
 
4.5.1. Policies and Procedures 
  
Organizations should have policies in place, which 
they consistently follow to avoid all kinds of legal 
ramifications (e.g. from discrimination to security).  In 
addition, findings discovered during technical reviews 
need to correctly identify which, if any, policies are 
effected.  (For example, if a system is missing 
authentication, then both a federal requirement as well 
as organizational policy is violated.) 
Procedures must also be in place, and specifically 
in writing.  Specific procedures, which must be in 
place at the federal level, include business continuity 
and potentially disaster recovery plans. 
Lastly, this sub-category encompasses the 
administrative controls to electronic patient data, which 
are federal requirements.  HIPAA requires certain 
administrative controls of patient information and the 
lack therefore needs to be correctly identified. 
 
4.5.2. Physical Security 
   
This component describes the physical security 
aspects of the system, if any, which are requirements in 
the United States Federal HIPAA laws.  
 
4.5.3. Budget for Adverse Effects 
  
Risk assessment traditionally includes developing a 
budget for adverse effects.  Many organizations are not 
storing-up financial resources in accordance to the 
risks being generated.  (For example, HITECH requires 
notifications when over 500 patients are affected.)  
Digital Guardian [23] has various reports on current 
costs per record; the costs vary with time.  Risk 
management, in addition to an application penetration 
test and connection to policies, should have a financial 
penalty indicator for both correct insurance coverage 
and potential organizational indirect costs/penalties.  
Thus, simply indicating that a web-application is 
vulnerable to CSRF, may really have no budgetary 
ramification under certain other conditions (e.g. no 
sensitive information, few people involved, etc.) 
 
5. A Risk Assessment Library 
 
This paper contributes a new open source risk 
assessment library example to enable researchers, 
penetration testers, risk assessment managers and 
institutions to further expand on a consistent risk 
assessment findings library with their policies, 
procedures, organizational controls and legal 
requirements. 
Bug libraries/dictionaries are being maintained by 
large organizations such as NIST and MITRE 
(described in Section 2).  Bug libraries/dictionaries do 
not include risk assessment (e.g. penetration test) 
findings.  As such, a risk assessment from one 
organization is traditionally written with completely 
different language choices from another organization 
making analysis extremely difficult.    
Eventually, our open-source risk assessment library 
will need to be maintained by either a standardizing 
body (e.g. NIST, MITRE)  or maintained by industry 
to orchestrate round-tables between different 
community discussions (e.g. law enforcement, 
penetration testers and regulators) to continuously 
update best practice language for such a library. 
Many organizations already may have their own 
framework in place for risk management.  Our library 
does not affect the framework, but rather helps 
organizations use standardized language when writing 
up their risk assessment reports.  For example, one 
penetration tester may indicate on a report “a SESSID 
is not random.”  Another penetration tester may 
indicate, “A session id is not random.” A third 
penetration tester may indicate, “A session identifier is 
not random.”  As we can see from this example, three 
different penetration testers wrote up three entirely 
different findings making meta-analysis on the findings 
extremely difficult.  In addition, external penetration 
testers may not indicate if findings are requirements 
under regulations such as HIPAA, PCI or SOX. 
This example library was developed from years 
working in industry with risk management and 
information security.  It was found during internal 
audits that reports for policy exceptions numbers led to 
difficult analysis since all risk assessment findings 
were written differently.  A risk assessment might 
mention that a password configuration led to higher 
risk, but it would not indicate that this was in fact a 
policy violation.  Depending on the risk assessment 
language, it was nearly impossible to collect accurate 
statistics about how many risk assessments findings 
were also in fact policy violations. 
 
5.1. Example Findings Library 
 
The open-source library example, seen in the 
Figure 1, applies standardized language.  The columns 
are the following: Vulnerability, Description, 
Remediation, Likelihood, Impact, Policy/Standard, 
NIST Controls, Related HIPAA, Other-Related-Legal, 
and Budget.   
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Figure 1: Risk Assessment Library 
 
The column descriptions are presented.  
Vulnerability summarizes the found weakness of the 
system/application. The Description column describes 
the weakness in high-level terms.  The Remediation 
column describes how to remediate the issue, if any.  
The Likelihood column describes the probability of 
occurrence.  The Impact column estimates the measure 
of damage from occurrence of the exploited 
vulnerability.  The Policy/Standard column gives the 
related and/or violated policy/standard.  The NIST 
Controls column expresses the related NIST SP 800-53 
controls.  The Related HIPAA column expresses the 
related US Federal HIPAA sections.  The Other-
Related-Legal column expresses other legal 
documentation such as Non-Disclosure Agreements, 
Service Level Agreements, etc.  The Budget column 
gives an estimated budget to prepare for damage.   
The different sheets of the page represent different 
risk assessment aspects such as the following: web-
application, physical security, training, vendors, 
policies and procedures, vendor and legal-
requirements.  Further work on the language employed 
during risk assessment should be legally verified to so 
that the business understands legal ramifications during 
data breach or hacking legal cases. 
To date, there are no publically available risk 
assessment libraries to connect the components of 
organizational risk discussed in Section 3.  
Furthermore, a risk assessment at one organization can 
be entirely distinct from a risk assessment at a different 
organization.  The disconnect between risk assessments 
can be on what was analyzed as well as the language 
used to write-up the assessment since everyone is 
predominately different units of measure.  As data 
breaches, legal requirements, government audits and 
security requirements expand and develop, a uniform 
library for assessing the risk will become essential for 
consistent auditing, cross-communication and cross-
collaboration between medial entities. 
 
5.2. Findings Library Use Case 
  
One well-known vulnerable application specifically 
designed to teach penetration concepts is Google’s 
Gruyere [20].  This application runs in its own sandbox 
and teaches users about common web application 
vulnerabilities that can be discovered during a 
penetration test.  The application thankfully does not 
house any electronic patient health information (ePHI).  
A penetration test of this application, as many 
applications used in medical settings, which actually 
do house ePHI, does not require consistent language 
and may not unearth violations to organizational 
policies, legal requirements, breach budget, or software 
development trainings.  As such, a strictly technical 
penetration test on a medical web application can lead 
to incorrect organizational risk management as it lacks 
any connection to the other risk components, such as 
policies, procedures and legal requirements, to inform 
on the overall risk and the potential legal breach budget 
requirements.   
The New York State (NYS) Information 
Technology Security (ITS) Policies [21] are wonderful 
examples for this proof-of-concept risk assessment 
when exploring the following risk assessment findings; 
however, in reality the organization should map their 
own policies/procedures into their specific risk 
assessment findings.     
 
5.2.1. Findings 1: Stored Cross-Site Scripting 
(XSS). Cross-site scripting is considered an 
injection/input validation software development 
programming error.  HIPAA does not specifically 
mention cross-site scripting within the law itself, but 
other interpretations about access control, 
confidentiality, integrity and availability could 
potentially affect legal recourse.  In addition, 
considering the NYS policies, accepting an XSS 
vulnerability may be in violation of the organizational 
Secure Coding Standard (NYS-S13-002), as it requires 
systems free of such software bugs.  During a risk 
assessment, not only should the finding be identified, it 
should be mapped with organizational 
policies/procedures, etc., to inform on the overall 
organizational risk, seen overall in Figure 2 and in 
detail in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
 
Figure 2: Risk Library – XSS Vulnerability 
 
Table 4: XSS Vulnerability (Columns 1-4) 
Vulnerability Description Remedy Likelihood 
System 
vulnerable 
to cross site 
scripting 
(XSS) 
Cross-Site 
Scripting 
(XSS) 
attacks are 
a type of 
injection, 
Output 
encoding 
and 
implement 
content 
security 
L - < 3 
people 
M - 1-20 
patients 
or < 100 
Employees 
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in which 
malicious 
scripts are 
injected 
into 
otherwise 
benign and 
trusted 
websites. 
policy 
header. 
H - 20+ 
patients, 
All 
Employees 
or Domain 
Admins 
 
Table 5: XSS Vulnerability (Columns 5-7 and 10) 
Impact Policy/ 
Standard 
NIST 
Controls 
Budget 
L - public 
information 
M -internal 
only 
information 
H - 
regulated 
information 
NYS-S13-002 - 
Secure Coding 
Standard 
SI-10 : 
INFORMAT
ION INPUT 
VALIDATIO
N 
L-$ 
($1K/per
son) 
M - $$ 
($2K/per
son)  
H -  $$$ 
($3K/per
son) 
 
5.2.2. Findings 2: Denial of Service. The application 
is susceptible to a denial of service attack based on 
how the application is constructed.  Again, denial of 
service is not mentioned in HIPAA directly; however, 
organizations are required maintain the availability of 
ePHI which is within an application.  Connecting this 
finding to policies, for example the NYS ITS policies, 
a violation of the Secure Coding Standard (NYS-S13-
002) occurs, which should be managed.  Figure 3 
shows the overall library with details in Tables 6 and 7. 
 
 
Figure 3: Risk Library – DoS Vulnerability 
 
Table 6: DoS Vulnerability (Columns 1-4) 
Vulner. Description Remedy Likelihood 
System 
vulnera
ble to 
denial 
of 
service 
(DoS). 
The system is 
vulnerable to an 
interruption in 
an authorized 
user's access to a 
computer 
network, 
typically one 
caused with 
malicious intent. 
Rate 
limiting, 
re-
coding 
L - < 3 people 
M - 1-20 
patients or < 
100 
Employees 
H - 20+ 
patients, All 
Employees or 
Domain 
Admins 
 
Table 7: DoS Vulnerability (Columns 5-7 and 10) 
Impact Policy/ 
Standard 
NIST 
Controls 
Budget 
L - public 
information 
M -internal 
only 
information 
H - 
regulated 
information 
NYS-S13-002 - 
Secure Coding 
Standard 
SC-5 : 
DENIAL OF 
SERVICE 
PROTECTIO
N 
L-$ 
($1K/per
son) 
M - $$ 
($2K/per
son)  
H -  $$$ 
($3K/per
son) 
 
5.2.3. Findings 3: Cookie Manipulation. The 
application is susceptible to cookie manipulation 
meaning that the session management vulnerable.  This 
particular finding is not discussed directly in HIPAA; 
however, HIPAA discusses access control standards, 
which may come into question in such a case where a 
known vulnerability exists.  Again, this particular 
finding violates the NYS Secure Coding Standard 
(NYS-S13-002).  A library example is given in Figure 
4 and in detail in Tables 8, 9 and 10. 
 
 
Figure 4: Risk Library – Cookie Vulnerability 
 
Table 8: Session Mgmt. Vuln. (Columns 1-4) 
Vulnerability Description Remediation Likelihood 
System/web-
application 
vulnerable to 
cookie-
manipulation. 
When cookie-
based session 
management 
is used, a 
message 
(cookie) 
containing 
user's 
information is 
sent to the 
browser by the 
web server. 
This cookie is 
sent back to 
the server 
when the user 
tries to access 
certain pages. 
Re-code, 
HTTPOnly, 
Secure 
L - < 3 
people 
M - 1-20 
patients 
or < 100 
Employees 
H - 20+ 
patients, 
All 
Employees 
or Domain 
Admins 
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Table 9: Session Mgmt. Vuln. (Columns 5-7 and 10) 
Impact Policy/ 
Standard 
NIST 
Controls 
Budget 
L - public 
information 
M -internal 
only 
information 
H - regulated 
information 
NYS-S13-
002 - 
Secure 
Coding 
Standard 
SC-23 : 
SESSION 
AUTHEN
TICITY 
L-$ 
($1K/person) 
M - $$ 
($2K/person)  
H -  $$$ 
($3K/person) 
 
Table 10: Session Mgmt. Vuln (Columns 8 and 9) 
Related HIPAA Other-Related-Legal 
164.312 (c) (2) Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) 
 
5.2.4. Findings 4: Lack of Application Auditing. 
This particular application may be found to be 
improperly auditing associated activities.  If the 
application were to house ePHI, then it would be 
required to provide auditing records under HIPAA.  
This would be a direct violation of the federal law.  
This particular finding would also be in violation of the 
NYS Security Logging (NYS-S14-005) policy, so a 
policy exception should be put into place.  A library 
row for this vulnerability is seen overall in Figure 5 
and in detail in Tables 11, 12 and 13. 
 
 
Figure 5: Risk Library – Auditing Vulnerability 
 
Table 11: Auditing Vulnerability (Columns 1-4) 
Vulnera. Description Remedy Likelihood 
System 
has a 
lack of 
auditing. 
An audit trail is a 
security-relevant 
chronological 
record, set of 
records, and/or 
destination and 
source of records 
that provide 
documentary 
evidence of the 
sequence of 
activities that have 
affected at any time 
a specific operation, 
procedure, or 
event. 
Re-code L - < 3 
people 
M - 1-20 
patients 
or < 100 
Employees 
H - 20+ 
patients, 
All 
Employees 
or Domain 
Admins 
 
Table 12: Auditing Vuln. (Columns 5-7 and 10) 
Impact Policy/ 
Standard 
NIST 
Controls 
Budget 
L - public 
information 
M -internal 
only 
information 
H - 
regulated 
information 
NYS-S14-005 - 
Security 
Logging 
AU-2 : 
AUDIT 
EVENTS 
L-$ 
($1K/per
son) 
M - $$ 
($2K/per
son)  
H -  $$$ 
($3K/per
son) 
 
Table 13: Auditing Vulnerability (Columns 8 and 9) 
Related HIPAA Other-Related-Legal 
164.312 (b) - 
 
5.2.5. Findings 5: Lack of Vendor Agreements.  
This particular application may be from a vendor.  In 
such a case, proper agreements such as a Business 
Associate Agreement (BAA) or other vendor 
requirements must be in place.  If the application is 
housing ePHI, then both HIPAA and the organizational 
polices/standards (e.g. NYS ITS Information Security 
Risk Management Standard (NYS-S14-001)) may be 
violated are at stake so the connection to the laws and 
policies/standards needs to be clear to effectively 
manage the risks to the organization.  Figure 6 
overview (and details in Table 14, 15 and 16) shows 
the finding library describing the vulnerability. 
 
 
Figure 6: Risk Library – BAA Vulnerability 
 
Table 14: BAA Vulnerability (Columns 1-4) 
Vulnerability Description Remediation Likelihood 
System has a 
lack of a 
vendor 
business 
associate 
agreement. 
A Business 
Associate 
Agreement 
or BAA is a 
legal 
document 
between a 
healthcare 
provider 
and a 
contractor. 
Put one in 
place. 
L - < 3 
people 
M - 1-20 
patients 
or < 100 
Employees 
H - 20+ 
patients, 
All 
Employees 
or Domain 
Admins 
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Table 15: BAA Vulnerability (Columns 5-7 and 10) 
Impact Policy/ 
Standard 
NIST Budget 
L - public 
information 
M -internal only 
information 
H - regulated 
information 
NYS-S14-001 
- Information 
Security Risk 
Management 
Standard 
- L-$ 
($1K/perso
n) 
M - $$ 
($2K/perso
n)  
H -  $$$ 
($3K/perso
n) 
 
Table 16: BAA Vulnerability (Columns 8 and 9) 
Related HIPAA Other-Related-Legal 
§ 164.504 (e) (1) Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) 
 
5.2. Findings Library Summary 
 
In summary, this use case example shows how the 
library can be used to standardize language for the risk 
assessment process therefore improving the entire 
process.  When each person in an organization (e.g. 
penetration tester, lawyer) uses their own personal 
language to describe risk components, then managing 
the risk and comparing risk among organizations is 
ineffective.  To date, no standardized library exists for 
such risk management requirements.  This research 
introduces such a standardized library and presents a 
use case.   
 
6. Future Work and Implications 
 
Risk is currently being distributed across many 
departments in medical institutions across the United 
States.  Most IRM solutions require the institutions to 
configure and customize the software to meet their 
own personal needs.  As such, organizational risk 
owners may face frustrations as to what risk they are 
inheriting and for what exactly they are liable during a 
breach of regulations by the organization, especially if 
they are the personnel involved in accepting the 
organizational risks.   
In fact, as people leave/retire and newer staff 
replace existing medical staff roles, the newer staff 
legally need to know what responsibilities and risks 
have already been accepted at their job-level by their 
predecessor.  Perhaps future job postings should reflect 
the expected level of risk, which is associated with the 
job position.  For example, breaches investigated by 
the US HHS OCR which result in organizational 
corrective action plans are inherited and stay with the 
breached organization for the duration of the 
organization’s legal responsibilities--even if the 
involved breach staff leave the organization.  Newer 
staff legally need to be appropriately informed of the 
organizational risks, which they have inherited since 
these risks fall into the jurisdiction of their job 
responsibilities.  The new employees have inherited the 
risk from a professional perspective, which may even 
need to be clear prior to accepting their new position. 
In addition, to further the risk management science, 
assessment findings risk measurements as determined 
by impact and more importantly likelihood should be 
further standardized across industries (e.g. healthcare) 
based on standardized metrics including the presences 
of well-known organizational controls (e.g., NIST 
Security Controls in SP 800-53 [22]).  This 
standardization will improve understandings and cross-
communication during international, national, state, 
city, and other legal scrutiny. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Risk management is essential for medical 
organizations to properly appropriate funds, budget 
human resources, fulfill their international legal 
requirements and uphold the privacy/security of their 
proprietary and patient information.  For example, 
Facebook [8] recently announced that it had 
appropriated three-billion dollars to prepare to pay 
government privacy fines.  In addition, the OCR 
Breach Notification website is filled with covered 
entity corrective action plans and their related fines.  
As privacy, security and data breaches expand, so will 
court cases and required audits.  In such legal cases, a 
standardized and connected risk assessment library and 
language will become indispensable for organizational 
risk communicating and collaborating. 
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